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We report three experiments to test the possibilities reasoners think about when they understand a con-ditional of the form ‘A only if B’ compared to ‘if A 
then B’. The experiments examine conditionals in the indicative mood (e.g., A occurred only if B occurred) and counterfactuals in the subjunctive mood (A 
would have occurred only if B had occurred). The ﬁrst experiment examines the conjunctions of events that reasoners judge  to  be  consistent  with 
conditionals, e.g., A and B, not-A and not-B. It shows that peo-ple think about one possibility to understand ‘if’ and two possibilities to understand ‘only if’; 
they think about two possibilities to understand counterfactual ‘if’ and ‘only if’. The second experiment shows that the possibilities people think about when 
they understand ‘only if’ are in a different temporal order (e.g., B and A) to the possibilities they think about for ‘if’ (A and B). The third experiment shows that 
people make different inferences from ‘only if’ and ‘if’ conditionals and counterfactuals. The implications of the results for  theories  of  counterfactual 
conditionals are considered. 
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1. Introduction 
People often imagine counterfactual alternatives about what 
might have been different in the past, particularly after bad out- 
comes, e.g., ‘if John had felt well he would have passed the exam- 
ination’ (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Mandel, Hilton, & Catellini, 
2005; Markman, Klein, & Suhr, 2009; Roese & Olson, 1995). People 
understand the counterfactual conditional to mean something dif- 
ferent from an indicative one, e.g., ‘if John felt well he passed the 
examination’ (Byrne, 2002, 2005, 2007). Moreover, they under- 
stand an indicative conditional based on ‘if’ to mean something dif- 
ferent from one based on ‘only if’, e.g., ‘John felt well only if he 
passed the examination’ (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1989). How do 
people understand counterfactual conditionals based on ‘only if’, 
such as ‘John would have felt well only if he had passed the exam- 
ination’? The answer is not known and our aim is to test a new ac- 
count of what people think about when they understand ‘only if’ 
conditionals, both indicative and counterfactual. 
We provide a novel account of how people understand and rea- 
son from indicative and counterfactual ‘only if’ conditionals. First 
we sketch the view that people envisage possibilities to under- 
stand indicative ‘if’ conditionals (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002), 
and we consider evidence that they think about more possibilities 
to understand counterfactual ‘if’ compared to indicative ‘if’. We 
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outline our new account in Sections 2 and 3, we report three exper- 
iments that test predictions derived from this account by compar- 
ing indicative and counterfactual ‘if’ and ‘only if’ conditionals. 
2. Indicative and counterfactual ‘if’ 
People may understand a conditional such as ‘if Mary went to 
the meeting then she received the documentation’ (if A then B) 
by thinking about possibilities, such as ‘Mary went to the meeting 
and she received the documentation’ (A and B) (Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 2002). The possibilities they think about may be constrained 
by principles. For example, people think about true possibilities 
but not false possibilities, such as ‘Mary went to the meeting and 
she did not receive the documentation’ (A and not-B) (Espino, San- 
tamaría, & Byrne, 2009; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). They tend to 
think about few possibilities, perhaps because of their limited 
working memories, and so they do not think about all of the true 
possibilities, e.g., they do not think initially about the other true 
possibilities, ‘Mary did not go to the meeting and she did not re- 
ceive the documentation’ (not-A and not-B), or ‘Mary did not go 
to the meeting and she received the documentation’ (not-A and 
B) (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). These principles of truth and par-
simony constrain the number of mental models of the possibilities 
that they construct (see Byrne and Johnson-Laird (2009) for a 
review). 
The model theory explains why people make some inferences 
readily, e.g., given ‘Mary went to the meeting’, most people make 
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the modus ponens inference, ‘she received the documentation’ 
(Johnson-Laird, 2006). The inference corresponds to the single pos- 
sibility they have thought about from the outset. They do not make 
other inferences readily, e.g., given ‘Mary did not receive the doc- 
umentation’ they do not make the modus tollens inference, ‘she 
did not go to the meeting’ (Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993). In- 
stead some of them infer erroneously that nothing follows. The 
information ‘Mary did not receive the documentation’ does not 
correspond to  the possibility they have  thought  about from the 
outset, Mary went to the meeting and she received the documen- 
tation. They have to think about other true possibilities to make 
the inference. Likewise given, ‘Mary received the documentation’ 
people sometimes make an afﬁrmation of the consequent inference, 
‘she went to the meeting’. To resist the inference they must think 
about other true possibilities, e.g., Mary did not go to the meeting 
and she received the documentation. Finally, given, ‘Mary did not 
go to the meeting’, they sometimes make the denial of the anteced- 
ent inference ‘she did not receive the documentation’. They do not 
make the inference if they have thought about just a single possi- 
bility, or if they have thought about all of the true possibilities. 
There is considerable evidence to support the mental  model 
view of reasoning (see Byrne and Johnson-Laird (2009) for a re- 
view). Nonetheless, the cognitive processes that underlie condi- 
tional reasoning continue to be a matter of debate. An alternative 
view is that reasoners rely on rules of inference, either abstract 
rules that operate in virtue of their form (e.g., Braine & O’Brien, 
1998; Rips, 1994), or domain-speciﬁc rules that are sensitive to 
some content (e.g., Fiddick, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2000; Holyoak & 
Cheng, 1995). Another alternative view is that reasoners rely on 
judgements of the probability of the conditional, either by suppos- 
ing the antecedent to be true and considering whether the conse- 
quent is true or false (e.g., Evans & Over, 2004; Evans, Over, & 
Handley, 2005),  or by judging the  likelihood of the  antecedent 
and consequent (e.g., Oaksford & Chater, 2007). The view that rea- 
soners imagine possibilities (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002) has of- 
fered the only empirically corroborated account of reasoning with 
counterfactual conditionals, and so we will outline it further here 
and return to alternative accounts later. 
A counterfactual conditional, e.g., ‘if Mary had gone to the meet- 
ing then she would have received the documentation’ can seem to 
mean something  quite different  from the indicative conditional. 
Logically, counterfactuals have false antecedents and so on a truth 
functional account they must be true (Quine, 1954), and an ac- 
count of their logic led to the development of ‘possible world’ 
semantics (Lewis, 1973; Stalnaker, 1968). Psychologically, the sub- 
junctive mood of the counterfactual, ‘if Mary had gone to the meet- 
ing then she would have received the documentation’ can help 
convey the presupposition that in fact,  Mary did not go to the 
meeting, and in fact, she did not receive the documentation (Fillen- 
baum, 1974). According to the model theory, people understand a 
counterfactual conditional by thinking about two possibilities, the 
conjecture, ‘Mary went to the meeting and she received the docu- 
mentation’, and the presupposed facts, ‘Mary did not go to the 
meeting and she did not receive the documentation’. They keep 
track of the epistemic status of these possibilities as imagined, or 
as corresponding to the facts (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991, pp. 
68–69). 
Evidence from inference and comprehension studies corrobo- 
rates the  idea that reasoners think about a  single  possibility  to 
understand indicative ‘if’ whereas they think about two possibili- 
ties to understand counterfactual ‘if’. First, people make more of 
the inferences that require access to the negative possibility (Mary 
did not go to the meeting and she did not receive the documenta- 
tion), that is, the modus tollens and denial of the antecedent infer- 
ences, from the counterfactual because they have access to the 
negative possibility for the counterfactual but not for the indicative 
conditional (Byrne & Egan, 2004; Byrne & Tasso, 1999). They make 
the same frequency of the afﬁrmative  inferences,  modus  ponens 
and afﬁrmation of the consequent, because they have access to the 
afﬁrmative possibility for both the counterfactual and  the  indica- 
tive. Second, people judge that  someone  uttering  the  counterfac- 
tual means to imply ‘Mary did not go to the meeting’ and ‘Mary 
did not receive the documentation’ (Thompson & Byrne, 2002). 
Third, when readers ﬁrst read a counterfactual they are then 
primed to read more quickly a subsequent negative conjunction 
‘Mary did not go to the meeting and she did not receive the docu- 
mentation’ compared to when they are primed by an indicative 
conditional (Santamaría, Espino, & Byrne, 2005). They read the 
afﬁrmative conjunction equally quickly whether it is primed by a 
counterfactual or an indicative (see also De Vega, Urrutia, & Riffo, 
2007; Stewart, Haigh, & Kidd, 2009). These three strands of evi- 
dence converge to support the view that people think about two 
possibilities when they understand counterfactual  ‘if’,  and  only 
one possibility when they understand indicative ‘if’. The evidence 
from priming studies supports the view that when  people  under- 
stand a counterfactual conditional, they  construct two possibilities 
from the outset during their  comprehension  of  the  counterfactual, 
that is, they think about dual possibilities in order to comprehend 
the meaning of the counterfactual assertion, independently of, and 
prior to, the task demands of inferential, consistency, or truth 
judgement tasks (Byrne, 2005). Of course there may be a  time 
course to their construction of each possibility one after the other, 
and different individuals may differ in which possibility they tend 
to construct ﬁrst. In the next section, we present a novel account of 
the possibilities that people envisage  to understand indicative  and 
counterfactual ‘only if’. 
3. Indicative and counterfactual ‘only if’
A conditional of the form ‘if Mary goes to the meeting then she 
receives the documentation’ (if A then B) is of course logically 
equivalent to one of the forms ‘Mary goes to the meeting only if 
she receives the documentation’ (A only if B) (Jeffrey, 1981). But 
their equivalence is not immediately obvious to most people. 
Nonetheless, people can appreciate that both conditionals are false 
in the same situation, that is, Mary goes to the meeting and she 
does not receive the documentation (A and not-B). The psycholog- 
ical interpretations of ‘only if’ have been debated (Evans, 1977; 
Keenan, 1971). An ‘only if’ assertion seems to work best when its 
second component (B) precedes in time its ﬁrst component (A) 
(Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Evans & Beck, 1981; Ormerod, Mankte- 
low, & Jones, 1993; Rips & Marcus, 1977; Thompson & Mann, 
1995). ‘Only if’ often contains a precondition in its consequent, 
for example, ‘you can go out to play only if you tidy your room’ 
(Girotto, Mazzocco, & Cherubini, 1992). 
Our view is that reasoners keep in mind different possibilities to 
understand ‘if’ and ‘only if’. We suggest that reasoners think about 
two possibilities from the outset to understand ‘only if’ (Johnson- 
Laird & Byrne, 1989). As a result, they can readily make both the 
modus ponens (A therefore B) inference and the modus tollens 
(not-B therefore not-A) inference from ‘only if’, unlike from ‘if’. Pre- 
vious research has shown that the difference between modus pon- 
ens and modus tollens inferences from ‘if’ disappears with ‘only if’, 
and reasoners can make both inferences readily (Evans & Beck, 
1981; Roberge, 1978). Moreover, we suggest that the possibilities 
people keep in mind preserve the temporal order of occurrence 
of events in the world (Byrne, 2005; Byrne, Segura, Culhane, Tasso, 
& Berrocal, 2000). Reasoners understand ‘A only if B’ by thinking in 
the direction B to A (Carriedo,  García-Madruga, Moreno, & Gut- 
iérrez, 1999; Evans & Newstead, 1977; see also García-Madruga, 
Gutiérrez,  Carriedo,  Moreno,  &  Johnson-Laird,  2002).  Hence  they 
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make more readily the afﬁrmation of the consequent (B therefore A) 
and modus tollens inferences (not-B therefore not-A) from ‘only if’ 
than from ‘if’. These two suggestions combine to result in the novel 
proposal that people understand ‘A only if B’ by thinking about two 
possibilities, in the direction B to A, that is, they think about ‘B and 
A’ and ‘not-B and not-A’. Existing evidence that supports this ac- 
count lies in the observation  that  reasoners  are  faster  to  make 
the backward ‘B to A’ inferences than the forward ‘A to B’ infer- 
ences from ‘only if’ (García-Madruga, Carriedo, Moreno, Gutiérrez, 
& Schaeken, 2008; Grosset & Barrouillet, 2003; Santamaría & Espi- 
no, 2002). Moreover, when reasoners read ‘A only if B’, they are 
primed to understand quickly ‘B and A’, and also ‘not-B and not- 
A’ (Santamaría & Espino, 2002, Experiment 3). Participants read 
‘not-B and not-A’ reliably faster when primed by ‘A only if B’ than 
when primed by ‘if A then B’. 
On our account, people understand counterfactual ‘only if’, e.g., 
‘Mary would have gone to the meeting only if she had received the 
documentation’ and indicative ‘only if’, e.g., ‘Mary went to the 
meeting only if she received the documentation’ by thinking about 
very similar possibilities, as Table 1 shows. For indicative ‘only if’ 
they think about two true possibilities, whereas for counterfactual 
‘only if’ one of the possibilities is understood to correspond to the 
counterfactual conjecture (B and A), and the other to the presup- 
posed facts (not-B and not-A). Nonetheless, because people envis- 
age these two possibilities for both indicative and counterfactual 
‘only if’, our account makes novel predictions about the possibili- 
ties people will judge to be consistent with the conditionals and 
about the inferences they will draw from them. We test this new 
hypothesis about the mental representations and cognitive pro- 
cessing of ‘only if’ by comparing indicative and counterfactual ‘if’ 
and ‘only if’ conditionals. 
4. Experiment 1
The aim of the ﬁrst experiment was to examine the possibilities 
that reasoners judge to be consistent with indicative  and counter- 
factual ‘only if’, and to compare them to indicative and counterfac- 
tual ‘if’. We gave participants problems that consisted of  a 
conditional premise, e.g., ‘Joe would have been  in  Meath  only  if 
Ann had been in Dublin’. They were given four possibilities: ‘Joe 
was in Meath and Ann was in Dublin’, ‘Joe was not in Meath and 
Ann was not in Dublin’, ‘Joe was not in Meath and Ann was in Dub- 
lin’, and ‘Joe was in Meath and Ann was not in Dublin’. They were 
asked to judge whether each possibility was ‘consistent’, ‘inconsis- 
tent’, or ‘irrelevant’ with regard  to the conditional. We examined 
judgements of consistency and inconsistency, in line with previous 
research on counterfactuals,  because  of  the unsuitability  of  judge- 
ments of truth (e.g., true, false, irrelevant) for counterfactual condi- 
tionals (Thompson & Byrne, 2002; see also Schroyens, 2008). 
We derived the following set of predictions from our novel ac- 
count of indicative and counterfactual ‘only if’: 
Table 1 
A summary of the possibilities people envisage initially for indicative and counter- 
factual ‘only if’ and ‘if then’. 
Form Mood 
Indicative Counterfactual 
If A then B A and B A and B (conjecture) 
. . . Not-A and not-B (presupposed facts) 
. . . 
A only if B B and A B and A (conjecture) 
Not-B and not-A Not-B and not-A (presupposed facts) 
. . . . . . 
Note: the ellipsis (. . .) indicates that there are other true possibilities consistent with 
the conditional which reasoners may have ﬂeshed out to be more explicit but which 
are not mentally represented in the initial models. 
(1) Indicative versus counterfactual ‘if’: in line with earlier 
research, we predicted people would tend to judge that the 
negative possibility (not-A and not-B) is consistent with a 
counterfactual more often than they would make this judge- 
ment for an indicative conditional (Thompson & Byrne, 
2002). People keep in mind  the  negative  possibility  from 
the outset for counterfactual ‘if’  but  not  for  indicative  ‘if’. 
We did not expect a difference in judgements about the 
afﬁrmative possibility (A and B) for factual and counterfac- 
tual ‘if’. 
(2) Indicative versus counterfactual ‘only if’: in contrast to our 
predictions for ‘if’, for ‘only if’ we expected that judgements 
about the consistency of possibilities for ‘only if’ would show 
no differences between indicative and counterfactual condi- 
tionals. People keep in mind two possibilities for both indic- 
ative and counterfactual ‘only if’. 
(3) ‘Only if’ versus ‘if’ indicative conditionals: our account com- 
mits us to the prediction of a difference in consistency 
judgements for indicative ‘only if’ and indicative ‘if’. We 
expect that reasoners will judge the ‘not-A and not-B’ possi- 
bility to be consistent more often following indicative ‘only 
if’ than indicative ‘if’,  and that  there  will be  no  difference 
for the afﬁrmative ‘A and B’ possibility. Earlier ﬁndings sug- 
gest that there may be no differences in judgements of the 
truth of such cases (e.g., Evans & Newstead, 1977). However, 
on our account reasoners think about the ‘A and B’ possibil- 
ity for both indicative ‘if’ and indicative ‘only if’, but they 
think about the negative possibility only for indicative ‘only 
if’. 
(4) ‘Only if’ versus ‘if’ counterfactuals: we expect that there 
should be no differences in judgements of consistency for 
counterfactual ‘only if’ and counterfactual ‘if’. On our 
account, both counterfactuals are understood by thinking 
about two possibilities. 
We conﬁned our predictions to the ‘A and B’ and ‘not-A and not- 
B’ cases and refrained from making predictions of any differences 
between the linguistic forms (‘if’ and ‘only if’) or the grammatical 
moods (subjunctive and  indicative) for   the  possibilities  ‘not-A 
and B’ and ‘A and not-B’. People do not often judge these possibil- 
ities to be consistent in such tasks: for example, they judge the ‘A 
and not-B’ possibility to be consistent or true about 5% of the time, 
and the ‘not-A and B’ possibility to be consistent or true about 15% 
of the time, as a recent meta-analysis shows (Schroyens, 2008). 
4.1. Method 
4.1.1. Materials and design 
We gave one group of participants a set of problems based on 
indicative conditionals (e.g., ‘if Joe was in Meath then Ann was in 
Dublin’), and the other group received counterfactual conditionals 
(e.g., ‘if Joe had been in Meath then Ann would have been in Dub- 
lin’). There were six problems in total, three ‘if A then B’ and three 
‘A only if B’ problems which were presented in blocks and counter- 
balanced across participants in a within-participant design. Each 
problem consisted of a conditional followed by four possibilities 
presented in random order (‘A and B’, ‘not-A and B’, ‘A and not-B’ 
and ‘not-A and not-B’). We used three sorts of neutral content: 
locations, ingredients (e.g., if David used basil then Jodie used pars- 
ley), and actions (e.g., if Mary walked then Fred jumped). To control 
for content effects, the contents were assigned to the problems at 
random twice to make two different sets of problems. 
4.1.2. Procedure 
The participants were tested in groups and were asked to sign a 
consent form prior to participating. The experimenter read the 
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Table 2 
Percentages of possibilities judged as ‘consistent’ in Experiment 1. 
not-B’ possibility to be consistent more often for counterfac- 
tual  ‘only  if’  than  indicative  ‘only  if’,  89%  versus  70%, 
A and B     Not-A and not- 
B 
Not-A and B     A and not-B t(42) = 2.25, p = .01. However, participants judged the ‘not- 
A and not-B’ possibility to be consistent with indicative ‘only 
If Indicative 99 58 3  4 
Counterfactual    100 90 0 0 
Only if    Indicative 97 70 10  3 
Counterfactual    100 89 13 0 
instructions aloud which asked participants to complete the prob- 
lems in the order they were presented and not to change any re- 
sponses once they had made them. The experimenter answered 
any questions the participants had and participants were advised 
that they could take as long as they needed to complete the task. 
4.1.3. Participants 
The participants were 44 undergraduate psychology students 
from Dublin Business School who took part voluntarily. They had 
not received any prior training in logic nor had they taken part 
in a reasoning study before. There were 31 women and 13 men 
and their average age was 25 years (with an age range from 19 
to 40 years). They were assigned at random to the indicative 
(n = 23) or counterfactual (n = 21) groups. 
4.2. Results and discussion 
We carried out a 2 x 2 x 4 ANOVA on the frequency with which 
participants judged a possibility to be consistent. The factors were 
linguistic mood (indicative, subjunctive), linguistic form (if, only if) 
and possibility (A and B, not-A and not-B, not-A and B, A and not- 
B), with repeated measures on the last two  factors.  There  were 
main effects of linguistic form, F(1, 42) = 4.72, Mse = .90, p = .02; 
mood,   F(1, 42) = 5.67,   Mse = 2.92,   p = .01;   and   possibility, 
F(1, 65) = 325.67,  Mse = 366.09, p < .01.1 Form  and mood did not 
interact, F(1, 42) = .15, Mse = .29, p = .35, but each interacted with 
possibility: form and possibility, F(2, 85) = 2.71, Mse = .77, p = .04; 
and mood and possibility, F(3, 126) = 6.08, Mse = 3.57, p < .01. The 
three-way interaction  was  marginal,  F(3, 126) = 1.72,  Mse = .33, 
p = .08. To test our  predictions we conducted  a  series of planned 
comparisons on the options ‘A and B’ and ‘not-A and not-B’. As Table 
2 shows, ‘not-A and B’ and ‘A and not-B’ were selected as consistent 
infrequently  (613%). 
(1) Indicative versus counterfactual ‘if’: as we predicted, partic- 
ipants judged ‘not-A and not-B’ to be consistent more often 
for counterfactual ‘if’ than indicative ‘if’, 90% versus 58%, 
t(39) = 2.88, p = .01, equal variances not assumed, and there 
was no difference for ‘A and B’, 99% versus 100%, t(42) = .96, 
p = .17.2 These ﬁndings support the idea that people  think 
about the negative possibility ‘not-A and not-B’ for a counter- 
factual more than an indicative conditional. The result is con- 
sistent with previous ﬁndings (e.g., Byrne & Tasso, 1999; 
Thompson & Byrne, 2002). 
(2) Indicative versus counterfactual ‘only if’: as we expected, 
there were no differences between indicative and counter- 
factual ‘only if’ for ‘A and B’, 97% versus 100%, t(42) = .96, 
p = .17.  Unexpectedly,  participants  judged  the  ‘not-A  and 
1 When  the  assumption  of  sphericity  was  not  met  the  Greenhouse–Geisser 
correction was used. 
2 Failure to detect a difference cannot be taken to show that one does not exist; in 
order to ensure that the lack of difference was not due to a lack of power  we 
calculated the power of the comparisons. All planned comparisons had 80% power to 
detect a difference of .2 or less, unless otherwise stated, indicating that if there were a 
difference between the groups it would be detected. 
if’ (70%), reliably more so than indicative ‘if’ as we will see 
below, supporting our suggestion that they  think  about 
two possibilities to understand indicative ‘only if’. Nonethe- 
less, they appear to think about the negative possibility even 
more readily for counterfactual ‘only if’. We return to this 
result in the next experiment. 
(3) ‘Only if’ versus ‘if’ indicative  conditionals:  participants 
judged ‘not-A and not-B’ to be consistent more often for 
indicative ‘only if’ than indicative ‘if’ as we predicted, 70% 
versus 58%, t(22) = 2.01, p = .03. There were no differences 
for ‘A and B’, 97% versus 99%, t(22) = 1.00, p = .17, again as 
expected. These results support  our  hypothesis  that  reason- 
ers initially think about just one possibility for indicative ‘if 
then’ conditionals, but two for indicative ‘only  if’ 
conditionals. 
(4) ‘Only if’ versus ‘if’ counterfactuals: there were no differences 
between ‘if’ and ‘only if’ counterfactual conditionals for ‘not- 
A and not-B’, 90% versus 89%, t(20) = .25, p = .40, and ‘A and 
B’, 100% for each, t(22) = .00, p = .5. This ﬁnding is consistent 
with our suggestion that people keep in mind two possibil- 
ities  for both sorts  of  counterfactual. 
The results of the experiment support our hypothesis that peo- 
ple understand ‘A only if B’ by thinking about two possibilities. The 
results are difﬁcult to explain on the view that people understand 
indicative ‘A only if B’, by keeping in mind a single possibility 
(Evans, 1993; Grosset & Barrouillet, 2003; Santamaría & Espino, 
2002). Such an account cannot explain the ﬁnding that participants 
judge ‘not-A and not-B’ to be consistent more often for indicative 
‘only if’ than for indicative ‘if’. The single-possibility view proposes 
that for ‘A only if B’ people think about a single possibility in the 
temporal order ‘B and A’ and they have a processing preference 
for making inferences in this direction, i.e., from B to A, whereas 
for ‘if A then B’ they think about a single possibility in the temporal 
order, ‘A and B’, and they have a processing preference for making 
inferences in this direction, i.e., from A to B. As a result, the back- 
ward inferences, afﬁrmation of the consequent (B therefore A) and 
modus tollens (not-B therefore not-A) are made more often from 
‘A only if B’ (e.g., Evans, 1993; Evans, Clibbens, & Rood, 1995, 
1996). In fact, the evidence that ‘if’ favours the forward inferences, 
modus ponens (A therefore B) and denial of the antecedent (not-A 
therefore not-B) is not clear-cut (see Evans, 1977; Evans & Beck, 
1981; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1989). 
The result that participants  readily  judge  both  ‘not-A  and not- 
B’ and ‘A and B’ to be consistent for indicative ‘only if’ is problem- 
atical for the view that reasoners tend to think about just a single 
possibility, in line with a ‘singularity principle’ (Evans, 2007; 
Evans & Over, 2004; Evans et al., 2005). So too is the result that 
reasoners think about these two  possibilities  for  counterfactual 
‘if’ and counterfactual ‘only if’). A singularity principle in the sup- 
positional theory constrains individuals to think about only a  sin- 
gle possibility (Evans & Over, 2004). On the suppositional account, 
the supposition of an antecedent and the assessment of the 
believability of the consequent occur in a  single  mental  simula- 
tion. The single mental  model  may  contain  information  added 
by pragmatic implicatures as well as information stated in the 
premise. Individuals assign a subjective probability to a condi- 
tional represented by  a  number  corresponding  to  their  strength 
of belief (Evans, 2007), e.g., ‘if Paul wins the lottery he buys a Fer- 
rari’  is  represented  as: 
• Paul wins the lottery ? .8 Paul buys a Ferrari
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B and A Not-B and not- 
A 
B and not-A Not-B and A 
If Indicative 88 40 9 16 
Counterfactual 82 72 5 5 
Only if Indicative 93 75 19 4 
Counterfactual 94 85 10 3 
Even a counterfactual conditional ‘if Paul had won the lottery he 
would have bought a Ferrari’ is represented in a single possibility, 
but in this case, according to the suppositional theory, the single 
mental model contains alternative components. Each component 
is annotated to include numbers corresponding to the strength of 
belief in the conditional, and the strength of belief in the individual 
components (Evans, 2007, p.74): 
• Paul had won the lottery ? .8 Paul would have bought a Ferrari
• [Paul did not win the lottery (.999); Paul did not buy a Ferrari
(.999)]. 
On our account, people imagine alternative possibilities to cor-
respond to these alternatives, the conjecture ‘Paul won the lottery 
and he bought a Ferrari’ and the presupposed facts, ‘Paul did not 
win the lottery and he did not buy a Ferrari’. The experimental evi- 
dence supports the conclusion that people think about these two 
distinct alternative possibilities when they understand indicative 
‘A only if B’, counterfactual ‘if A then B’ and counterfactual ‘A only 
if B’. 
Our experimental results support our predictions with one 
exception: participants judged ‘not-A and not-B’ to be consistent 
more often for counterfactual ‘only if’ (89%) than for indicative 
‘only if’ (70%), whereas we expected no difference. Their judge- 
ments that ‘not-A and not-B’ is consistent with indicative ‘only if’ 
are reliably higher than for indicative ‘if’ (58%) and so it cannot 
be the case that reasoners are thinking about a single possibility 
in each case (pace Evans & Over, 2004; Evans et al., 2005). We con- 
jecture that the judgements about ‘not-A and not-B’ may have been 
somewhat suppressed in the indicative ‘only if’ condition (70%) 
compared to the counterfactual ‘only if’ condition (89%), because 
of the presentation of the response options in the direction of A 
to B, rather than B to A. The order in which the information enters 
working memory (i.e., A followed by B) could impact on the judge- 
ments (Espino & Hernandez, 2009; Grosset & Barrouillet, 2003). It 
may be that the subjunctive mood of the counterfactual provides 
an additional cue to encourage the representation of the negative 
possibility, and so the impact of the order in which the information 
enters working memory is observed more strongly for indicative 
‘only if’. On our account, reasoners think about two possibilities 
to understand ‘A only if B’, and both possibilities are in the direc- 
tion B to A, that is, they think about ‘B and A’ and about ‘not-B 
and not-A’ (see Table 1). Accordingly, our next experiment exam- 
ines judgements of consistency for possibilities phrased in the 
direction of B to A. 
5. Experiment 2
The aim of the second experiment was once again to examine
the possibilities that reasoners judge to be consistent with indica- 
tive and counterfactual ‘A only if B’, and to compare them to indic- 
ative and counterfactual ‘if A then B’, this time for four possibilities 
in the B to A order: B and A, not-B and not-A, not-B and A, and B 
and not-A. We made the same predictions as in the previous exper- 
iment. We aimed to test the prediction that people would judge 
‘not-B and not-A’ to be consistent with counterfactual ‘only if’ 
and indicative ‘only if’ equally often when the possibilities were 
presented in the B to A direction. 
5.1. Method 
5.1.1. Materials, design and procedure 
The materials used were the same as the previous experiment 
with the exception that the possibilities were presented in the or- 
der B to A, rather than A to B. The procedure was the same as in the 
previous experiment. We used the same general design and in this 
experiment both mood and linguistic form were between-partici- 
pant variables, hence there were four groups of participants: indic- 
ative ‘if’, indicative ‘only if’, counterfactual ‘if’ and counterfactual 
‘only if’. 
5.1.2. Participants 
The participants were 95 undergraduate psychology students 
from Mary Immaculate College, University of Limerick, who took 
part voluntarily. They had not received any prior training in logic 
or taken part in a reasoning study before. There were 82 women 
and 13 men and their average age was 22 years (with an age rang- 
ing from 17 to 52 years). They were assigned at random to one of 
four groups, indicative ‘if’ (n = 25), indicative ‘only if’ (n = 23), 
counterfactual ‘if’ (n = 20) or counterfactual ‘only if’ (n = 27). 
5.2. Results and discussion 
We analysed the results in an ANOVA carried out on the possi- 
bilities that participants selected as ‘consistent’. The factors were 
linguistic mood (indicative, counterfactual), linguistic form (if A 
then B, A only if B) and possibility (B and A, not-B and not-A, 
not-B and A, B and not-A), with repeated measures on the last fac- 
tor. There was a main effect of linguistic form, F(1, 91) = 10.09, 
Mse = 5.75,    p < .01,    and     possibility,     F(2, 273) = 202.92, 
Mse = 193.6, p < .01, but not of mood, F(1, 91) = .23, Mse = .13, 
p = .32.  Possibility   interacted   with   form,   F(3, 273) = 4.97, 
Mse = 3.51,  p < .01,  but   not  with  mood,  F(3, 273) = 5.15, 
Mse = 3.64,  p < .01,  and  mood  and  form   did   not   interact, 
F(1, 91) = .23, Mse = .13, p = .32. The three-way interaction was 
not reliable, F(3, 273) = 1.54, Mse = 1.08, p = .1. To test our predic- 
tions we conducted a series of planned comparisons on the non- 
signiﬁcant three-way interaction (see Winer (1971) for the legiti- 
macy of such comparisons) to test judgements about the possibil- 
ities ‘B and A’ and ‘not-B and not-A’: 
(1) Indicative versus counterfactual ‘if’: as we predicted, partic- 
ipants judged ‘not-B and not-A’ to be consistent more often 
for counterfactual ‘if’ than indicative ‘if’, 72% versus 40%, 
t(43) = 2.59, p = .01, and there was no difference for ‘B and 
A’, 88% versus 82%, t(43) = .73, p = .24. This ﬁnding replicates 
the results of Experiment 1 and extends them to possibilities 
in the B to A direction. 
(2) Indicative versus counterfactual ‘only if’: as expected, there 
were no differences between indicative and counterfactual 
‘only if’ for ‘B and A’, 93% versus 94%, t(48) = .23, p = .41, as 
Table 3 shows. Also as expected, participants judged ‘not-B 
and not-A’ to be consistent as often for counterfactual ‘only 
if’ as indicative ‘only if’, 75% versus 85%, t(37.02) = .99, 
p = .16, equal variances not assumed. The result corroborates 
the hypothesis that the direction of the response options in 
the previous experiment may have contributed to the unex- 
pected difference for ‘not-A and not-B’ judgements between 
counterfactual and indicative ‘only if’. 
(3) ‘Only if’ versus ‘if’ indicative: as expected, participants 
judged ‘not-B and not-A’ to be consistent more often for 
indicative ‘only if’ than for ‘if’, 75% versus 40%, t(46) = 2.97, 
Table 3 
Percentages of possibilities judged as ‘consistent’ in Experiment 2. 
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p = .01, and there were no differences for ‘B and A’, 93% ver- 
sus 88%, t(46) = .76, p = .23. The result replicates Experiment 
1, for responses in the direction B to A. 
(4) ‘Only if’ versus ‘if’ counterfactuals: as expected, there were 
no differences between ‘if’ and ‘only if’ counterfactual condi- 
tionals for ‘not-B and not-A’, 85% versus 72%, t(31.46) = 1.33, 
p = .10, or ‘B and A’, 94% versus 82%, t(25.6) = 1.51, p = .08. 
The result replicates the ﬁrst experiment. 
 
Experiment 2 replicates the ﬁndings of Experiment 1 and ex- 
tends them to possibilities phrased in the B to A direction. The re- 
sults are consistent with our proposal that people understand ‘only 
if’ conditionals by thinking about two possibilities in the B to A 
direction, ‘B and A’ and ‘not-B and not-A’: the direction of the re- 
sponse options in Experiment 1 led to an unexpected difference 
for ‘not-A and not-B’ judgements between counterfactual and 
indicative ‘only if’ and this difference was eliminated in Experi- 
ment 2 for ‘not-B and not-A’ judgements. However, a comparison 
of the results of Experiments 1 and 2 shows that participants ap- 
pear to judge ‘A and B’ and ‘B and A’ to be consistent with indica- 
tive ‘A only if B’ equally often (97% and 93%, respectively), and with 
counterfactual ‘A only if B’ equally often (100% and 94%, see Tables 
2 and 3). Likewise, they judge ‘not-A and not-B’ and ‘not-B and not- 
A’ to be consistent with indicative ‘A only if B’ equally often (70% 
and 75%) and with counterfactual ‘A only if B’ equally often (89% 
versus 85%). Hence, we test our proposal further in the next exper- 
iment by comparing forward inferences (e.g., not-A therefore not- 
B) and backward inferences (e.g., not-B therefore not-A) for ‘if A 
then B’ and ‘A only if B’. We predict systematic differences between 
‘if A then B’ and ‘A only if B’ to arise not only because of the number 
of possibilities to be kept in mind from the outset, but also because 
of the direction of the possibilities. 
Experiment 2 provides further evidence that people tend  to 
think about two possibilities to understand indicative ‘A only if 
B’ conditionals whereas they think about a single possibility ini- 
tially to understand indicative ‘if A then B’ conditionals. According 
to the suppositional theory: ‘The proposal that  two  models  are 
used to represent the ‘only if’ conditional is inconsistent with the 
singularity principle of our own hypothetical thinking theory.’ 
(Evans & Over, 2004, p. 70). As a result, the data from Experiment 
2 present difﬁculties for the idea that individuals think about just 
one possibility for indicative ‘A only if B’. 
People understand indicative and counterfactual ‘A only if B’ 
conditionals by keeping in mind the  same  two  possibilities,  ‘B 
and A’ and ‘not-B and not-A’. In contrast, people understand indic- 
ative and counterfactual ‘if A then B’ conditionals by thinking about 
different possibilities initially: they think about a single possibility 
to understand indicative ‘if’, ‘A and B’, and they think also about a 
second possibility to understand counterfactual ‘if’, ‘not-A and not- 
B’. The differences  between indicative and counterfactual ‘if’ and 
‘only if’ lead us to predict that different inferences  will be made 
from the different sorts of conditionals and  our  ﬁnal  experiment 
tests the inferences people make from counterfactual ‘only if’ com- 
pared to indicative ‘only if’. 
 
 
6. Experiment 3 
 
The aim of the experiment was to examine the inferences that 
reasoners make from indicative and counterfactual ‘if’ and ‘only 
if’. Participants were given a conditional such as, ‘Joe would have 
been in Meath only if Ann had been in Dublin’. They were given 
a second premise such as ‘Ann was in Dublin’. They were asked 
to say what if anything follows from the premises, and they chose 
their conclusion from a set, ‘therefore, (a) Joe was in Meath, (b) Joe 
was not in Meath, (c) Joe may or may not have been in Meath’. 
We derived a novel set of predictions about the expected fre- 
quency of inferences based on our proposal that people think about 
two possibilities in the direction of B to A for ‘A only if B’ indicative 
and counterfactual conditionals whereas they think about one pos- 
sibility in the direction of A to B for ‘if A then B’ indicative condi- 
tionals and two possibilities in the direction A to B for ‘if A then 
B’ counterfactuals: 
 
(1) Indicative versus counterfactual ‘if A then B’: on our account 
people think about one possibility initially for indicative ‘if A 
then B’ (A and B), and two possibilities for counterfactual ‘if 
A then B’ (A and B, not-A and not-B). Accordingly, we 
expected that reasoners would make more of the negative 
inferences, modus tollens (not-B therefore not-A) and denial 
of the antecedent (not-A therefore not-B),  from  counterfac- 
tual ‘if A then B’ compared to indicative ‘if A then B’. We 
expected that reasoners  would  make  the  same  frequency 
of the afﬁrmative inferences, modus ponens (A therefore B) 
and afﬁrmation of the  consequent (B therefore  A). We 
expected to replicate the ﬁndings of previous research  for 
these inferences from indicative and counterfactual ‘if  A 
then B’ (Byrne & Tasso, 1999). 
(2) Indicative versus counterfactual ‘A only if B’: on our account 
people think about two possibilities for indicative and coun- 
terfactual ‘A only if B’ (B and A, not-B and not-A) and so we 
expected that reasoners would make the same frequency of 
inferences from both indicative and counterfactual ‘A only if 
B’, unlike indicative and counterfactual ‘if A then B’. 
(3) ‘A only if B’ versus ‘if A then B’ indicative conditionals: on 
our account reasoners think about two possibilities for indic- 
ative ‘A only if B’, in the direction B to A; they envisage ini- 
tially one possibility for ‘if A then B’ in the direction A to B. 
On this account reasoners should make more modus tollens 
(not-B therefore not-A) and afﬁrmation of the consequent (B 
therefore A) inferences from ‘A only if B’ compared to ‘if A 
then B’, because the possibilities they think about for ‘A only 
if B’ are in the same B to A direction as these inferences. On 
this account, reasoners should also make more of the nega- 
tive inferences, modus tollens (not-B therefore not-A) and 
denial of the antecedent (not-A therefore not-B), from ‘A only 
if B’ because they think about the negative possibility from 
the outset. Hence we predict more modus tollens, afﬁrmation 
of the consequent, and denial of the antecedent  inferences 
from indicative ‘only if’ compared to indicative ‘if’. 
(4) ‘A only if B’ versus ‘if A then B’ counterfactuals: on our 
account reasoners  think   about  two  possibilities  for  both 
sorts of counterfactuals, but in a different direction, B to A 
for ‘only if’ and A to B for ‘if’. Accordingly, we predicted that 
reasoners would make more modus tollens and afﬁrmation of 
the consequent inferences from ‘only if’ counterfactuals com- 
pared to ‘if’ counterfactuals, because the possibilities they 
think about for  ‘only  if’  counterfactuals  are  in  the  same  B 
to A direction as these inferences. We also predicted they 
would make more modus ponens and denial of the antecedent 
inferences from ‘if’ counterfactuals for the same reason – the 
possibilities they think about for  ‘if’  counterfactuals  are  in 
the same A to B direction as these inferences. 
 
 
6.1. Method 
 
6.1.1. Materials and design 
We constructed two sets of problems, an indicative set and a 
counterfactual set and all the  assertions were in the past tense. 
Each set contained 24 problems, 12 for the linguistic form ‘if’ and 
12 for ‘only if’. We used three sorts of neutral content as in the pre- 
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 Modus ponens 
Afﬁrmation of 
the consequent 
Modus 
tollens 
Denial of the 
antecedent 
If A then B Indicative 100 67 79 63 
 Counterfactual 100 67 71 84 
A only if B Indicative 95 84 96 79 
 Counterfactual 98 73 92 68 
 
 
vious experiment: locations, actions and ingredients (e.g., Joe 
would have been in Meath only if Ann had been in Dublin). Each 
problem consisted of a conditional premise and a categorical pre- 
mise corresponding to modus ponens (Joe was in Meath), modus tol- 
lens (Ann was not in Dublin), denial of the antecedent (Joe was not in 
Meath) and afﬁrmation of the consequent (Ann was in Dublin) and 
participants had a choice of three conclusions to select from as 
shown in the example earlier. Each type of inference was presented 
once for each content and for each linguistic form (i.e., 4 infer- 
ences x 3 contents x 2 linguistic forms = 24 problems). To control 
for content effects,  the contents  were assigned to the  problems 
at random twice to make two different sets of problems. The prob- 
lems were presented in two blocks (‘if’ problems and ‘only if’ prob- 
lems) and these blocks were counterbalanced across all 
participants. The 12 problems within each block were presented 
in a different random order for each participant. 
 
6.1.2. Procedure 
Participants were tested individually  or in groups of two  or 
three participants. They ﬁrst signed a consent form and then the 
24 problems were presented on Macintosh computers using Super- 
Lab 1.75. The instructions were presented on the computer and in- 
cluded an example problem and three practice problems (based on 
conjunctions and disjunctions of shapes) to familiarise participants 
with the task presentation and keyboard response options. Partic- 
ipants were advised that they could take as long as they needed to 
complete the task. They pressed the space bar to view each new 
piece of information (the conditional, the minor premise, the con- 
clusion set), and each remained on screen to be joined by the sub- 
sequent information. The participants pressed one of the keys 
labelled ‘a’, ‘b’, or ‘c’ to select a conclusion. These keys were in 
the centre of the keyboard and corresponded to the T, G, and B 
keys, respectively. 
 
6.1.3. Participants 
The participants were 40 undergraduate psychology students 
from Trinity College, Dublin, who participated voluntarily for 
course credits. There were 28 women and 12 men and their aver- 
age age was 22 years, ranging from 18 to 45 years. They had not 
been trained in logic nor had they participated in any previous rea- 
soning study. They were assigned at random to the indicative 
group (n = 19) or the counterfactual group (n = 21). 
 
6.2. Results and discussion 
 
We analysed the results in an ANOVA on the endorsements of 
conclusions with the factors of mood (indicative, counterfactual), 
form (if then, only if), and inference (modus ponens, tollens, denial 
of the antecedent and afﬁrmation of the consequent), with re- 
peated measures on the last two factors. It showed a main effect 
of  form,  F(1, 38) = 3.98,  Mse = 3.41,  p = .03,  and  inference, 
F(2, 89) = 12.62,   Mse = 13.09,   p < .01,   but   not   of   mood, 
F(1, 38) = .05, Mse = .09, p = .41. Form interacted with inference, 
F(2, 94) = 4.16, Mse = 2.38, p = .01, but not mood, F(1, 38) = 1.70, 
Mse = 1.46, p = .10, and mood and inference  did  not  interact, 
F(3, 114) = .67, Mse = .55, p = .29. The three-way interaction was 
reliable, F(3, 114) = 2.61, Mse = 1.24, p = .03. To test our predictions 
we carried out a series of planned comparisons: 
 
(1) Indicative versus counterfactual ‘if A then B’: we replicated 
the ﬁndings of previous research that reasoners tend to 
make more negative inferences from counterfactual ‘if’ com- 
pared to indicative ‘if’, and the difference was reliable for the 
denial of the antecedent, 84% versus 63%, t(38) = 1.79, p = .04, 
although not for modus tollens, 71% versus 79%, t(38) = .66, 
p = 0.26, perhaps because we found a particularly high rate 
of modus tollens for indicative ‘if’ in this experiment (79%). 
As expected there were no  differences  in  the  frequency  of 
the afﬁrmative inferences, modus ponens, 100% in each case, 
t(38) = .00, p = .5, and afﬁrmation of the consequent, 67% in 
each case t(38) = .00, p = .5, as Table 4 shows. 
(2) Indicative versus counterfactual  ‘A only if B’: as expected, 
reasoners made the same frequency of inferences from both 
indicative and counterfactual ‘only if’ conditionals, unlike 
indicative and counterfactual ‘if’. There were no differences 
in the frequency of negative  inferences  from  counterfactual 
and indicative ‘only if’, for the denial of the antecedent, 68% 
versus 79%, t(38) = 1.00, p = .17, and modus tollens, 92% ver- 
sus 96%, t(38) = 1.09, p = .14. Likewise, there were no differ- 
ences in the afﬁrmative inferences from counterfactual and 
indicative  ‘only  if’,  for  modus  ponens,  98%  and   95%, 
t(38) = .92, p = .18, and afﬁrmation of the  consequent,  73% 
and 84%, t(38) = 1.03, p = .15. The result is consistent with 
our  hypothesis  that  people   think   about   two   possibilities 
for both indicative and counterfactual ‘only if’ (B and  A, not-
B and not-A). 
(3) ‘A only if B’ versus ‘if A then B’ indicative conditionals: as we 
predicted, reasoners made more of the backward inferences 
from ‘A only if B’: signiﬁcantly so for modus tollens, 96% ver- 
sus 79%, t(18) = 2.04, p = .03, and marginally so for afﬁrma- 
tion  of  the  consequent  inferences,  84%  versus  67%, 
t(18) = 1.56, p = .07, from ‘A only if B’ compared to ‘if A then 
B’. This result supports the suggestion that the possibilities 
they think about for ‘only if’ are in the same B to A direction 
as these inferences. Also as we expected, they made more of 
the negative inferences, modus tollens (as reported above) 
and marginally more denial of the antecedent, 79% versus 
63%, t(18) = 1.63, p = .06, from ‘only if’ and the result sup- 
ports the suggestion that they think about the negative pos- 
sibility ‘not-B and not-A’ as well as the afﬁrmative one ‘B and 
A’. As expected there were no differences for modus ponens, 
95% versus 100%, t(18) = 1.37, p = .09. The results for modus 
tollens and afﬁrmation of the consequent are compatible with 
previous research (e.g., Evans et al., 1995). The predicted 
result for the denial of the antecedent inference corroborates 
our suggestion that reasoners think about the negative pos- 
sibility, and the magnitude of the difference between ‘only if’ 
and ‘if’ for this inference (79% versus 63%) is impressive 
given that for ‘only if’ it is a ‘backward’ inference (i.e., in 
the direction A to B whereas the mental representation is 
in the direction B to A). In fact earlier studies also show some 
small differences in the predicted direction between ‘only if’ 
and ‘if’ for denial of the antecedent (e.g., Evans et al., 1995), 
despite it being a negative and backward (for only if) 
inference. 
(4) ‘Only if’ versus ‘if’ counterfactuals: as we expected reasoners 
made more of the B to A inferences from ‘A only if B’ coun- 
terfactuals compared to ‘if A  then  B’  counterfactuals,  and 
the difference was reliable for modus tollens, 92%  versus 
71%, t(20) = 2.44, p = .01, although not for afﬁrmation of the 
consequent, 73% versus 67%, t(20) = .68, p = .25. The results 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Percentages of conclusions endorsed by participants in Experiment 3. 
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provide some support for the suggestion that the possibili- 
ties people think about for ‘A only if B’ counterfactuals are 
in the same B to A direction as these inferences. Also as we 
expected, they made more of the A to B inferences from ‘if 
A then B’ counterfactuals compared to ‘A only if B’ counter- 
factuals and the difference was reliable for the denial of the 
antecedent inferences, 84% versus 68%, t(20) = 2.35, p = .02, 
although not for modus ponens which was at ceiling, 98% ver- 
sus 100%, t(20) = 1.00, p = .17. The result provides some sup- 
port for the suggestion that the possibilities people think 
about for ‘if A then B’ counterfactuals are in the same A to 
B direction as these inferences. The result supports our sug- 
gestion that reasoners keep two possibilities in  mind  for 
both sorts of counterfactuals, but in a different direction, B 
to A for ‘A only if B’ and A to B for ‘if A then B’. 
 
The results for inferences in this experiment are consistent with 
the results for consistency judgements in Experiments 1 and 2. The 
results are difﬁcult to explain on the view that ‘A only if B’ is para- 
phrased to capture a double negative similar to ‘if not-B then not- 
A’ (e.g., Braine, 1978). On this account, the modus tollens inference 
(not-B therefore not-A) is made readily because it is in effect a 
modus ponens one (A therefore B) from ‘if not-B then not-A’ (Braine, 
1978). But on such an account modus ponens should be difﬁcult (it 
is in effect modus tollens from ‘if not-B then not-A’), and as the re- 
sult show, it is not (see also Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1989). 
The results are also difﬁcult to explain on the view that ‘A only if 
B’ is interpreted as ‘A, if B’, in other words, ‘if B, A’. Note that ‘if B, A’ 
is false in the situation ‘B and not-A’; it is true in the situations ‘B 
and A’, ‘not-B and not-A’, and ‘not-B and A’. But if individuals inter- 
preted ‘A only if B’ to mean ‘if B then A’, they should not make the 
modus ponens inference (‘A only if B’, and ‘A’, therefore ‘B’). Nor 
should they make the modus tollens inference. Yet they make these 
inferences readily as previous studies have shown (Evans, 1977; 
Evans & Beck, 1981; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1989). Moreover, as 
Table 3 shows, only 19% of  participants in  Experiment  2  judged 
the ‘B and not-A’ situation to be consistent for ‘A only if B’; 9% 
made this judgement for ‘if A then B’. 
The results replicate the ﬁndings of previous experiments on 
inferences from indicative and counterfactual ‘if A then B’. They 
provide the ﬁrst comparison of inferences from indicative and 
counterfactual ‘A only if B’. They support the novel proposal that 
reasoners understand and reason from  indicative  and  counterfac- 
tual ‘A only if B’ by thinking about two possibilities in the direction 
B to A (B and A, and not-B and not-A). 
 
 
 
7. General discussion 
 
We have provided a new account of the mental representations 
and cognitive processes underlying ‘A only if B’. An indicative con- 
ditional, ‘if A then B’ is understood by keeping in mind initially the 
possibility ‘A and B’ (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). In contrast, ‘A 
only if B’ is understood by thinking about two possibilities from 
the outset, in the B to A direction: ‘B and A’ and ‘not-B and not- 
A’. We have also provided the ﬁrst account of the mental represen- 
tations and cognitive processes underlying counterfactual ‘A only if 
B’. The counterfactual ‘if A had been then B would have been’ is 
understood by envisaging initially two possibilities, the conjecture 
‘A and B’ and the presupposed facts ‘not-A and not-B’ (Byrne & Tas- 
so, 1999; Thompson & Byrne, 2002). The counterfactual ‘A would 
have been only if B had been’ is understood initially by thinking 
about the same two possibilities as for the indicative ‘A only if B’, 
the conjecture, ‘B and A’, and the presupposed facts ‘not-B and 
not-A’. 
The results of the three experiments support this new account 
of indicative and counterfactual ‘A only if B’ and corroborate exist- 
ing accounts of indicative and counterfactual ‘if A then B’: 
 
(1) For indicative and counterfactual ‘if A then B’, people judge 
the possibility ‘not-A and not-B’ to be consistent with the 
counterfactual more than the indicative conditional, as 
Experiments 1 and 2 showed, and they make more of the 
negative inferences from the counterfactual than the indica- 
tive conditional, as Experiment 3 showed. The results repli- 
cate the ﬁndings of previous research, supporting the view 
that people think  about a single  possibility  for  indicative 
‘if’ (A and B), and two possibilities for counterfactual ‘if’ (A 
and B, not-A and not-B) (Byrne & Tasso, 1999; Thompson 
& Byrne, 2002). 
(2) For indicative and counterfactual ‘only if’, people judge the 
possibilities ‘B and A’ and ‘not-B and not-A’ to be consistent 
for both conditionals, as Experiment 2 showed, and they 
make the same frequency of inferences from the condition- 
als, as Experiment 3 showed. The  results  support  the  view 
that people think about two possibilities for indicative and 
counterfactual ‘only if’ in the direction B to A  (B  and  A, not-
B and not-A). 
(3) For ‘only if’ and ‘if’ indicative conditionals, people judge the 
‘not-B and not-A’ possibility to be consistent more often for 
indicative ‘only if’ than indicative ‘if’, and there is no differ- 
ence for ‘B and A’, as Experiments 1 and 2 show. They make 
more of the B to A inferences, modus tollens and afﬁrmation of 
the consequent, and more of the negative inferences, modus 
tollens and denial of the antecedent, from ‘only if’ than from 
‘if’, as Experiment 3 shows. 
(4) For ‘only if’ versus ‘if’ counterfactuals, people judge the ‘B 
and A’ and the ‘not-B and not-A’ possibility to be consistent 
equally often for both sorts of conditionals, as Experiments 1 
and 2 show. However,  the direction of  the possibilities has 
an inﬂuence on the inferences reasoners make, as  Experi- 
ment 3 shows. Reasoners made more of the backwards 
modus tollens inference and fewer of the forwards denial of 
the antecedent inferences from ‘only if’ than from ‘if’. 
 
We suggest that reasoners think initially about two possibilities 
to understand ‘only if’, ‘B and A’, and ‘not-B and not-A’. Our sugges- 
tion is distinct from the view that ‘only if’ is a biconditional (‘if and 
only if A then B’). On a biconditional account both the denial of the 
antecedent and the afﬁrmation of the consequent inference should 
be made more often from ‘only if’ than from ‘if’. On our account, 
reasoners may tend to make more of  these inferences,  because 
they have constructed two possibilities,  but  prudent  reasoners 
can ﬂesh out these possibilities to think about a third one, ‘B and 
not-A’. Previous studies have shown that the afﬁrmation of the 
consequent inference is made more readily and more quickly from 
‘only if’ (Evans, 1977; Evans & Beck, 1981; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 
1989; Santamaría & Espino, 2002), and our results are consistent 
with them. But, the denial of the antecedent inference is unstable. 
Most studies of ‘only if’ have been based on truth table tasks (e.g., 
Evans et al., 1996) or the selection task (e.g., Evans, Legrenzi, & Gir- 
otto, 1999), but the few inference studies show that the denial of 
the antecedent  inference is sometimes made more often, some- 
times less often, and sometimes the same (e.g., Evans, 1977; Evans 
& Beck, 1981; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1989). In Experiment 3, rea- 
soners made the denial of the antecedent  inference  more  often 
from ‘only if’ than from ‘if’, as we predicted, corroborating our sug- 
gestion that they thought about the negative possibility (not-B and 
not-A). Nonetheless, reasoners can ﬂesh out their initial under- 
standing of ‘only if’ to be more explicit if necessary, and they can 
appreciate that a third possibility is consistent, ‘B and not-A’. Just 
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as counterfactual ‘if’ is not necessarily interpreted as a  bicondi- 
tional ‘if and only if’ (Thompson & Byrne, 2002), so too indicative 
and counterfactual ‘only if’ are not necessarily interpreted as 
biconditionals. For example, in Experiment 1  the  ‘not-A  and  B’ 
was judged consistent with indicative ‘only if’ (10%) and counter- 
factual ‘only if’ (13%) more  so  than  indicative  or  counterfactual 
‘if’ (3% and 0%, respectively); likewise in Experiment 2 the ‘B and 
not-A’ possibility was judged consistent with indicative ‘only if’ 
(19%) and counterfactual ‘only  if’  (10%)  more so  than  indicative 
or counterfactual ‘if’ (9% and 5%, respectively). 
The results are difﬁcult to explain if reasoners tend to construct 
only a single mental model (Evans, 2007; Evans & Over, 2004). 
First, the results go against the idea that people keep in mind only 
a single possibility for ‘A only if B’ even if in the direction B to A 
(Evans, 1993; Grosset & Barrouillet, 2003; Santamaría & Espino, 
2002). The observation of no difference between indicative and 
counterfactual ‘only if’ is difﬁcult to explain if a single possibility 
is envisaged for indicative ‘only if’. In fact, previous observations 
that reasoners read ‘not-B and not-A’ faster when they are primed 
by ‘A only if B’ than ‘if A then B’ (Santamaría & Espino, 2002) also go 
against the idea that people keep a single possibility in mind. Sec- 
ond, the results also go against the idea that people construct only 
a single mental model to understand counterfactual conditionals 
(Evans, 2007; Evans & Over, 2004; Evans et al., 2005). The experi- 
ments reported here show that participants judge the possibility 
‘not-A and not-B’ to be consistent with counterfactual ‘if’ more 
than indicative ‘if’ and they make more of the negative inferences 
from counterfactual ‘if’ than indicative ‘if’. Both of these lines of 
evidence, from indicative ‘only if’ and from counterfactuals, are 
incompatible with the singularity principle of the suppositional 
theory (Evans & Over, 2004; Evans et al., 2005). 
When people think about a counterfactual, e.g., ‘if there had 
been a triangle on the blackboard there would have been a circle’ 
they think about two possibilities,  for  counterfactuals  based  on 
‘if’ (Byrne & Tasso, 1999; Santamaría et al., 2005), ‘even if’ (Moren- 
o-Rios, García-Madruga, & Byrne, 2008), and ‘only if’, as we have 
shown. One possibility corresponds to the conjecture temporarily 
supposed to be true, ‘there was a triangle and there was a circle’ 
and the other to the presupposed facts ‘there was no circle and 
there was no triangle’. 
The generation of counterfactual thoughts is very common in 
everyday life, especially after bad outcomes (e.g., McEleney & By- 
rne, 2006; Roese, 1997; Walsh & Byrne, 2007). People express their 
counterfactual thoughts in many different ways. The assertion ‘if I 
had married a millionaire I would have owned a string of horses’, 
conveys subtly different information from the assertion, ‘I would 
have married a millionaire only if I had owned a string of horses’. 
We suggest that reasoners keep in mind initially two possibilities 
to understand both, the  conjecture ‘I married a millionaire  and 
owned a string of horses’, and the presupposed facts ‘I did not mar- 
ry a millionaire and did not own a string of horses’. But the possi- 
bilities differ in their temporal direction, A to B for the former (‘I 
married a millionaire and owned a string of horses’) and B to A 
for the latter (‘I owned a string of horses and married a million- 
aire’). The rich complexity of language allows counterfactual 
thoughts of varying nuances to be conveyed readily, as our explo- 
ration of ‘only if’ counterfactuals suggests. 
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